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1 Introduction 
 
 Fault Tolerance is a deep subject with hundreds of sub-topics.  It is often 
difficult to know where to begin the study of this vast subject.  The purpose of this 
paper is to illustrate the key issues in architectural-level fault tolerance by way of 
example.  The main objective is to explain the rationale and identify the trade-offs 
between the variety of techniques that are used to achieve fault tolerance. The 
primer focuses on high-level fault tolerance concepts (i.e. architectural) rather 
than low-level mechanisms such as Hamming codes or protocols used for 
communication.  For information about the latter the reader is referred to 
[Pradhan86].  
2 Basics 
 
 Fault Tolerance is founded on redundancy.   If we have two or more 
identical components we can ignore the faulty component or switch to a spare if 
the primary fails.  Of course this assumes that we know when the failure occurs.  
Some failures are easy to detect, e.g. the device just stops working.  Other 
failures are not, e.g., the device continues to work but produces incorrect results.  
So immediately we are confronted with one of the reasons that the fault tolerance 
field is broad—systems are designed to handle different kinds of failures.  Some 
systems are designed to handle fail-stop faults.  Others are designed to handle 
any kind of fault.  Still others are designed to handle faults that can be detected 
via a diagnostic program.  Sometimes the faults are always assumed to be the 
manifestation of a physical disruption, while other system designs seek to survive 
logical errors as well. There are many possibilities.   Many designs seek to 
survive the class of faults that are assumed to be common and provide little or no 
capability against what are assumed to be less common failures.   Ideally, the set 
of faults handled by a system is delineated in a well-specified fault model. 
 
3 Faults and Failures  
3.1 Faults 
 
 A fault is a defect in the hardware or software that can lead to an incorrect 
state. Faults can arrive randomly from the physical failure of hardware (e.g. 
stuck-at-one bit) or a bit-flip in memory due to electromagnetic upset or they can 
arrive in a non-random manner if they are due to manufacturing defects or logical 
mistakes in a design.  System failure occurs when the delivered service deviates 
from the correct service. 
 
 When developing a fault-tolerant system, the designer makes 
assumptions about the types of faults that must be handled.   This is often 
referred to as the system fault model.  The fault model elaborates all of the 
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assumptions about how components of the system can fail. The following types 
of faults are often considered: 
• Fail stop (or fail silent) -- the component stops producing outputs when it 
fails 
• Fail benign – the component’s failure is recognized by all non-faulty 
components 
• Fail symmetric – the fault results in the same erroneous value being sent 
to all other replicates 
• Fail asymmetric (Byzantine) – the fault results in different erroneous 
values being sent to some of the other replicates 
See [Thambidurai88] for more details about this classification. 
 
Also the duration of the fault may be considered: 
• Permanent faults – once they occur they do not disappear 
• Transient faults – appear for a short time and then disappear (e.g., upset 
from electromagnetic interference). 
• Intermittent faults --  they appear, disappear and then reappear  
 
However, it should be noted that although a fault is transient, it can still produce 
permanent error in the system state if the system is not designed to handle 
transients.   
 
Some defects or events can trigger multiple simultaneous errors.  This class of 
fault is referred to as common cause faults (CCF) and if not mitigated they may 
overcome all of the available redundancy and hence cause system failure. 
Sources of common cause faults are many and varied and require special 
consideration in the design of a fault tolerant system.  The following is a partial 
list of common cause faults: 
• Design flaw (i.e. bug)  in software  
• Hardware design errors (e.g., logical error in a processor) 
• Compiler error 
• Manufacturing defects  
• Environmental induced effects (e.g. MMOD, Lightning, EMI, Launch 
shock/vibrations) 
 
Computer systems can also be vulnerable to common-mode failure if they rely on 
a single source of power or any other needed resource. 
 
3.2 Errors 
 
A rigorous definition of an error is non-trivial.  Intuitively it is the manifestation of 
the fault in some visible state of the system that you actually care about.  The 
standard IEEE definition states that an error impacts a service.   Avizienis, 
Laprie, Randell, Landwehr [Avizienis04] write 
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Since a service is a sequence of the system’s external states, a service 
failure means that at least one (or more) external state of the system 
deviates from the correct service state. The deviation is called an error… 
In most cases, a fault first causes an error in the service state of a 
component that is a part of the internal state of the system and the 
external state is not immediately affected. For this reason, the definition of 
an error is the part of the total state of the system that may lead to its 
subsequent service failure. It is important to note that many errors do not 
reach the system’s external state and cause a failure. A fault is active 
when it causes an error, otherwise it is dormant. 
   
An error is detected if its presence is noted by the system via an error message 
or error signal. Errors that are present but not detected are latent errors. 
 
Note: a fault is usually defined fairly broadly as a defect within the system.  This 
definition includes “software bugs” in addition to physical failures such as a 
memory “stuck-at-1” fault.  It also includes the bit flips induced by noise in 
communications systems.  Because the techniques used to detect and remove 
software bugs (e.g. logical mistakes) are very different from the techniques used 
to handle physical faults, it is very important to distinguish situations where one is 
talking about physical faults and when one is talking about “design errors”.   
 
3.3 Fault Tolerance Mechanisms 
 
The primary goal of fault-tolerance is to prevent errors from leading to system 
failure.  The fault tolerance functionality of a system is sometimes decomposed 
into the following: 
1. Fault masking – preventing an error from propagating to a system output. 
2. Error detection  -- observing a difference between system state and the 
expected state. 
3. Error recovery – an attempt to restore the system state to an error-free 
state. 
4. Reconfiguration – removing a faulty component from the system 
 
The techniques used to achieve this functionality is a major focus of this paper. 
 
It is very important to recognize that redundancy alone does not provide fault-
tolerance.  There must be mechanisms that coordinate and control the 
redundancy and make decisions and selections concerning the redundant 
information.  These mechanisms may be centralized or distributed, they may be 
implemented in hardware or software, they may be simple or complex, but it is 
absolutely essential that these mechanisms be designed correctly.  If there is a 
logical defect in the design of the redundancy management logic, system failure 
can occur even when there is no physical failure in the system.  For example, 
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most of the problems which were discovered in the AFTI F-16 flight tests at 
Dryden were due to defects in the redundancy management logic [Mackall88].   
3.4 Fault Containment Regions  
 
Fault tolerant systems are often built around the concept of fault containment 
regions (FCRs). The primary goal of a FCR is to limit the effects of a fault and 
prevent the propagation of errors from one region of the system to another.  A 
FCR is a subsystem that will operate correctly regardless of any arbitrary fault 
outside the region.   FCRs must be physically separated, electrically isolated, and 
have independent power supplies. Physical dispersion limits the effect of physical 
phenomena such as the impact of a micrometeoroid. Electrical isolation protects 
against fault propagation from lightning or other forms of static discharge. Power 
supply isolation prevents a power failure affecting the entire system. The number 
of FCRs in a system is a primary factor in determining how many faults a system 
can tolerate without failure. 
 
3.5 Design for Minimum Risk   
 
Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) is a process that allows safety-critical 
mechanisms to claim adequate fault tolerance through rigorous design, analysis, 
testing, and inspection practices rather than through true physical redundancy. 
DFMR is intended as an option when physical redundancy is highly impractical or 
too expensive. DFMR is primarily used on mechanical systems and is not 
intended for computer systems.  Johnson Space Center policy [MA2-00-057] 
permits the use of “fully compliant simple mechanical systems” without 
redundancy in safety-critical applications when they meet certain special 
requirements AND are approved by the Mechanical Systems Working Group and 
the safety review panel.  More information is available at  
 
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PR_8705_002A_&page_name=AppendixB 
http://mmptdpublic.jsc.nasa.gov/mswg/Policies.htm#DFMR 
 
and from [Stephans04]. 
 
4 Watch-dog Timers 
 
A well known type of system failure is the non-responsive system or locked-up 
system, which is sometimes referred to as the “blue screen of death” in desktop 
computers.  This is usually the result of a software bug that throws the system 
into a non-operable state (e.g. an erroneous jump into the data space).   When 
this occurs in a desktop computer, a simple reboot usually suffices to recover the 
system.  But in some safety-critical systems, operator restart is not available or 
 7
appropriate (e.g. requires a response time that is beyond normal human 
capability).  In these systems, a watch-dog timer can be helpful.   
The simplest approach is to have some watch-dog subsystem observe “I’m alive” 
messages which are periodically produced by the primary.  If these messages 
disappear then the watch-dog system initiates some recovery action such as 
reboot or rollback to a previous safe state.  It is also possible to have the 
watch-dog system turn over control to a backup system.  There are several 
issues here, but the most important is how to protect the system from failures in 
the watch-dog subsystem.   
 
5 Voting 
 
 Fault tolerant systems are usually designed to handle more than just fail-
stop faults, so inevitably some form of voting must be employed.  There are 
many varieties, but there are roughly three basic categories of voting: exact 
match, fault-tolerant average, and mechanical.  In the exact match case all of the 
replicates including their internal data are assumed to be identical so any bit in 
an output that differs may be an indication of failure.  One can simply select the 
majority value and use that value for the system output.  In averaging, the good 
replicates are assumed to be “close” to each other but not identical.  So the 
medial values either come from non-faulty components or they are bound by 
other good values1.  Either way the selection of a median or an average of some 
middle values is enough to mask a faulty component 
 
Mechanical voting can be performed at the actuators of a system.  Each replicate 
provides a fraction of the “force” needed to actuate the physical component.  
These forces are added mechanically.  In this way a failed component can be 
out-forced by the other good components.  Though the force will be different than 
nominally commanded, this is compensated by the use of feedback control.   
 
Voting can also be used to detect or diagnose which component of the system is 
faulty, but careful engineering is required to determine when a disagreement in a 
vote may be used for the diagnosis of faults. This is discussed in Section 8 
(Diagnosing Failed Components). 
 
The following diagram illustrates the concept of voting: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  By assuming that there is only one faulty component, we have two cases: (1) the faulty component  is the 
middle value, in which case it is between two good values, so the faulty component is still producing an 
acceptable output, or (2) the faulty component is one of the extreme values, in which case the middle value 
came from a good component. 
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However, it should be noted that voting is often implemented as a distributed 
algorithm that executes on the redundant computers themselves.  Also voting is 
not just employed at the outputs of fault tolerant systems. System inputs (i.e. 
sensor inputs), and intermediate results can be voted as well. It is not uncommon 
for the voting to occur in software when the underlying hardware has sufficient 
interconnect.  When software voting is done, information is passed between 
processors and then voting algorithms are used to select a result. If not designed 
properly, the logic for exchanging and voting can be another source of faults, 
namely design defects.  Some fault-tolerant systems are designed to maintain 
exactly the same data in the redundant lanes, while other systems seek to 
maintain close but not exact agreement in the lanes.  See Section 16 (Re-Usable 
Fault Tolerance and System Layering) for a discussion of the pros and cons of 
these alternatives. 
6 Interactive Consistency 
 
A fundamental issue in a fault-tolerant system is how to distribute input data to 
the replicates in a manner that preserves consistency.    Because inputs begin as 
single source data, we must be sure that the replicate consistency is not 
destroyed by a failure in the distribution system.    
 
Different methods can be used to distribute sensor values to the replicates 
• Single sensor sampled by all processors 
• Single sensor sampled by a processor that distributes the value to all 
other processors 
• Redundant sensors each sampled by all processors 
• Redundant sensors each of which is sampled by a single processor that 
distributes its value to all other processors 
 
Even if there are multiple sensors the individual sensor values are distributed to 
each of the computers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sensors computer
sensors computer
sensors computer
VOTER Actuators
sensors computer
sensors computer
sensors computer
VOTER Output
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The following diagram illustrates the problem with asymmetric failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So after the failure one good channel will be operating on a value of 177 and 
another on a value of 176.  If exact-match voting is used on the outputs, then the 
wrong processor will be identified as failed.  If mid-value select voting is used on 
the outputs, then there will be no immediate problem.  However, if the 
asymmetric fault persists over many iterations, the deviation between the two 
good channels can continue to get larger and larger and eventually exceed the 
threshold set for fault diagnosis.   Once again the wrong processor can be 
reconfigured out of the system.   Recent results at NASA Langley (Paul Miner) 
have shown that a two-stage mid-value select can be designed to achieve 
Byzantine Agreement.  However most asynchronous systems today have not 
been designed using this particular strategy.  
 
As shown above some types of faults are more insidious and require more FCRs 
to properly mask them. For example, it has been shown [Driscoll03] that 
tolerating f Byzantine faults requires: 
• 3f+1 Fault Containment Regions (FCRs) 
• FCRs must be interconnected through 2f+1 disjoint paths 
• Inputs must be exchanged f+1 times between FCRs 
• FCRs must be synchronized to a bounded skew 
 
Consequently a simple triple modular redundant (TMR) system is not Byzantine 
Resilient, that is, there are some single faults that can defeat it. But it is important 
to realize that the FCR need not be a complete processor.  All that is needed is 
enough circuitry to perform the interactive consistency algorithm. To withstand a 
Analog Data (177)
176
177
107
faulty
Input channels processing
176,207,177
176,007,177
176,107,177
Mid-value
177
176
176
will look faulty in future majority votes
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single asymmetric fault, one needs four fault isolation regions, but they need not 
all be full channels.  A very simple circuit can provide the necessary functionality 
to implement critical Byzantine Agreement algorithms.  If the circuit is electrically 
isolated it can serve as one of the fault isolation regions.   This idea was first 
exploited in the Draper FTP computer system: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A triplex FTP contains six components, but only three of them are full processors. 
The three interstages are simple circuits requiring approximately 50 gates.  Thus, 
the overall hardware complexity, and hence the fault-arrival rate, of a triplex FTP 
is less than a quadruplex.  So its cost and reliability are correspondingly better 
than using six complete processors. Furthermore, a quadruplex FTP provides 
fault tolerance comparable to a 5-plex, but with only four full processors. 
 
This idea of utilizing special hardware to off-load the redundancy management 
functions from the computing resources has gained popularity in recent years.  
This strategy has been used in SafeBUS, TTP/C, FTPP, and SPIDER.   
 
The beauty of modern fault-tolerance is that you don't have to replicate entire 
"strings" to increase your ability to withstand more types of faults. To withstand a 
single asymmetric fault, one needs four fault isolation regions, but they need not 
all be full channels.  A very simple circuit called an interstage can provide the 
necessary functionality to implement critical Byzantine Agreement 
algorithms. This was first done by Draper Labs in their FTP architecture [Lala ].   
Since the interstage is electrically isolated it can serve as one of the fault 
isolation regions.  It merely relays messages and does not participate in the 
voting steps that provide fault-tolerance in FTP.  Full protection from a Byzantine 
fault is achieved with only three processors and three interstages. The Draper 
FTPP built on this foundation and developed a parallel processing version 
[Harper91].   
 
7 Clock Synchronization 
 
It is usually advantageous to provide many layers of voting in a fault-tolerant 
system and not just rely on a final force-sum voting at the actuators. If the system 
processors
interstages
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is designed to perform a vote within the processors itself, it is necessary that 
there be some mechanism to synchronize the clocks of the system so that this 
vote can be scheduled and accomplished.  Fault tolerant systems that 
synchronize the clocks on the redundant processors are called synchronous 
fault-tolerant systems.  Systems that do not synchronize the clocks are called 
asynchronous fault-tolerant systems. 
 
The algorithms that perform clock synchronization are inherently distributed 
algorithms because the algorithm would not be fault-tolerant if it were based on 
some centralized timer.  Fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithms are 
notoriously difficult to get right. Simple intuitive solutions don’t always work.  
7.1 Impact of Asymmetric Failures 
 
An intuitive yet vulnerable approach is to build a fault-tolerant clock using three 
different clocks that are fully connected.  At a pre-determined fixed rate, each 
clock sends its value to the other clock.  Each clock then examines the arriving 
clock values and updates its own clock to the mid value of the three.  So if there 
is only one faulty clock, it is either one of the outer values or it falls between two 
good values.  Either way the selection of the mid value is appropriate.  But this 
analysis overlooks the impact of an asymmetric failure, i.e. where the failed clock 
sends one value to one of the good clocks and a different value to the other good 
clock.  This is illustrated in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here both clocks 1 and 2 are non-faulty, but clock 1 is faster than real time 
and clock 2 is slower than real time. When clock 3 fails it sends clock 1 a 
Clock Time
Real Time
Perfect Clock
Re-sync time
Clock 1
(fast)
Clock 2
(slow)
Clock 3 
as seen by 1
Clock 3 
as seen by 2
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value bigger than clock 1 and sends clock 2 a value smaller than clock 2.  
Therefore both clock 1 and clock 2 select themselves as the mid value and 
continue to drift apart.  If clock 3 continues to do this, clocks 1 and 2 can drift 
arbitrarily far apart even though they continue to execute the synchronization 
algorithm. 
 
7.2 Fault-tolerant Clock Synchronization Algorithms 
 
Many different algorithms have been developed which achieve fault-tolerant 
clock synchronization.  Because of the subtleties associated with these 
algorithms they are usually accompanied by formal proofs of correctness  
[Ramanathan90]. A proof is provided that the algorithm maintains all of the good 
processor’s clocks to within a small skew of each other, often denoted as ε2: 
 
                                 |Cp(t) - Cq (t) | < ε 
   
Where Cj(t) denotes the clock time of processor j at real time t.  Once you have 
this implemented in your system, the voting system can be reliably built on top of 
this as follows:  
1. A vote is scheduled at a predetermined time (usually in a static schedule 
table) 
2. Let D = the maximum transport delay in sending a clock value from one 
processor to another over the communication system3. 
3. The vote is delayed until D + ε  time units after the scheduled vote time.  In 
this way all of the good processors are guaranteed to have good values 
from all of the good clocks. 
 
Fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithms are based on the idea of periodic 
resynchronization. At a predetermined cycle time, all clocks exchange their 
current values.  Then each local clock executes some filtering and/or averaging 
function to calculate a new clock value.  It then updates its own local clock value 
with the new value.   Most of these algorithms are simple to describe but the 
proof that the algorithm works correctly in the presence of an arbitrary failure can 
be very difficult [Rushby89]. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The bound on the clock skew is determined by the variance of the communication times and 
not the mean.   The mean can be subtracted out in the clock sync algorithms. 
 
3 Note that this means that communication system must have a maximum delay.  If a databus is 
used it must have predictable behavior and bounded communication delays.  Therefore fault-
tolerant systems are developed using TDMA rather than CSMA/CD communication protocols. 
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7.3 Application-Level Reference Time 
 
Although we have talked about clock synchronization between replicate 
computers, we have not addressed the issue of obtaining a clock time that is 
synchronized to an external time source.   This is important if the application level 
software is event-driven by external events.   If the fault-tolerant system must 
interact with other external systems and this interaction is based upon some 
external time, then the operating system must provide this time source to the 
applications.   
 
The NIST Internet Time Service can be used to synchronize the clock of any 
computer connected to the Internet.  However, due to the unreliability of the 
internet, this is not a suitable candidate for a safety-critical system.  For a safety-
critical system the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is a used for 
navigation throughout the world, is more suitable.  GPS signals are derived from 
atomic clocks on the satellites so they can be used as a reference for time 
synchronization and frequency calibration.   
 
8 Diagnosing Failed Components 
 
There are 3 basic methods for diagnosing when a component has failed: 
• Using the discrepancies in the exact-match votes 
• Thresholds on the mid-value select voting 
• Using built-in test (BIT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Detection Using Exact-Match Voters 
 
The most straight-forward mechanism for detecting a failed processor is the 
exact-match voter.  If the lanes of the fault-tolerant system are synchronized, 
then system can use exact-match, majority voting.  Detection of the faulty lane is 
simple because the correct lanes all agree bit by bit.   Any deviation from the 
sensors computer
sensors computer
sensors computer
VOTER
Actuators
sensors computer
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majority value is an indication of failure.  But it should be noted that this strategy 
depends critically upon the use of interactive consistency algorithms to properly 
distribute single source data to the replicates.   See Section 6 (Interactive 
Consistency). 
 
8.2 Detection Using Thresholds 
 
If the lanes (i.e. FCRs) are asynchronous, then the inputs will be sampled at 
slightly different times and so the memory states of the different lanes will not be 
exactly the same.  In this case the system must use a mid-value select or 
averaging algorithm.  Unfortunately, mid-value selection algorithms alone do not 
provide a way to detect and isolate a faulty lane.  To accomplish this, thresholds 
must also be used.  A threshold is the maximum amount of deviation from the 
average value that is tolerated before a lane is declared to be faulty.  The system 
designer must set thresholds so that most failures are detected, but he must be 
careful not to make them too tight so as to cause excessive false alarms.  
Consequently it can be very difficult to determine appropriate levels for the 
thresholds and it requires extensive testing  [Mackall88]. 
 
8.3 Detection Using Built-in-Test (BIT) 
 
Built-In-Test (BIT) mechanisms run automatically and seek to isolate faulty 
components without the use of redundancy.  There are two basic types: power-
on bit (PBIT) which executes at startup and continuous BIT (CBIT) that runs 
continuously on a system.  CBIT can be periodically scheduled or executed 
whenever there is any slack time available. Built-In-Test can be implemented in 
software or directly on an integrated circuit.   The latter is sometimes referred to 
as circuit-level Built In Self Test (BIST) and is characterized by well-developed 
standards (e.g. IEEE 1149).    
 
The ideal BIT would be one that could detect every possible fault, but 100% 
coverage is rarely achievable in practice. It is not uncommon to see requirements 
on the order of 98% coverage, that is, the BIT can detect 98% of all possible 
faults.  Also most BIT mechanisms also produce some level of false alarms.  
Because of the imperfection of BIT, it is not usually used as the first line of 
defense in most safety-critical systems.  Rather it used to augment the 
functionality of the redundancy management system and aid in identifying a 
faulty component.  BIT is also extremely important for off-line maintenance and 
repair. 
 
 
 
 15
9 Real time Operating Systems and Fault Tolerance 
 
Traditional real time operating systems (RTOS) do not provide direct system 
services that manage redundant processes.  Nevertheless, custom software can 
be developed that accomplishes this task.  A primary goal of this custom 
software is to hide the details of the process management and voting.  The 
application software should be designed as if there were only simplex versions of 
the software.  All of the details about replication and voting should be hidden 
from the applications.  Nevertheless, the applications will have visibility into 
whether the simplex abstractions are preemptible or non-preemptible.  If the 
tasks are preemptible, then an additional challenge must be met, namely how 
can I be assured that all of the critical tasks meet their hard real-time deadlines.  
While this is the classic problem that RTOS’s solve, it should be noted that in this 
situation the RTOS will be scheduling redundant tasks with a strict need to vote 
their outputs at task completion.  In the non-preemptible case, this problem is 
usually solved by using a preplanned static table.  This is what was done in 
SafeBUS and TTP/C [Rushby01]. 
 
 
10 Reconfiguration 
 
Once a component has been identified as faulty, it is sometimes advantageous to 
remove the faulty component from the system through a reconfiguration process. 
Reconfiguration is built around the idea of “ignoring the outputs” of components 
that have been diagnosed as faulty by the community of good processors (i.e. 
the working set).  There are diagnosis algorithms that work in the presence of 
even malicious asymmetric failures yet guarantee that all of the good processors 
have a consistent view of who is faulty as long as a majority of the processors 
are working.  It is usually not a good idea to design the system in a manner that 
allows a component to shut down (e.g. power-down) another component.   
Failures in the shut-down circuitry can lead to the removal of good components.  
Of course it is often appropriate to provide manual means for the human 
operators to accomplish this task. 
 
A system that can survive a single fault is sometimes referred to as one fault-
tolerant.  A system that can survive two faults is referred to as two fault-tolerant4.  
A two fault tolerant system is usually constructed using reconfiguration, however 
a five-plex with five-way voting can mask two simultaneous faults.5  A four plex 
that reconfigures to a three-plex is an example of a two fault-tolerant system. 
                                                 
4 The N fault-tolerant characterization is very crude.  The use of actual reliability numbers is much to be 
preferred.  A one fault-tolerant system can be more reliable than a two fault-tolerant system if the latter has 
a higher processor failure rate. 
5 This assumes that there are at least two additional fault containment regions for solving the interactive 
consistency problem in order to be sure that we are guaranteed to have replicate consistency in the 5-plex. 
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Because the reconfiguration process relies on fault-detection, it is usually 
desirable to augment the detection by voting with built-in test.  If the system 
reliability requirements do not warrant reconfiguration, then built-in test may not 
be needed, since the voters can provide the needed fault masking capability.  
However, in a reconfigurable system it is desirable to minimize fault-latency (i.e. 
the time period from fault arrival to its manifestation as an error) because while 
the first fault is latent, a second fault may arrive in another component.  The 
simultaneous presence of two faulty components will defeat the typical 3-way 
voter.   The time that it takes for the system to detect, isolate and reconfigure a 
faulty component directly impacts its reliability.  Interestingly, a two-fault tolerant 
system can actually have a lower reliability than a one-fault tolerant system, if its 
reconfiguration time is poor or if its components have much higher failure rates.  
Therefore it is desirable to specify the system fault tolerance requirements in 
terms of a probability of system failure rather than as simply one or two-fault 
tolerant. 
 
It is important to note that the view of the working set must be consistent 
throughout the system.  This is sometimes referred to as the distributed 
diagnosis problem.  It is essential that one verifies that all good components 
agree who is in the working set.   In system initialization or in recovery from a 
massive transient upset, establishing this working set is the fundamental 
challenge.   If the system employs smart actuators, it is necessary that the 
computers systems in these smart actuators know what is in the “working set” so 
that the physical force-sum voters can know which inputs to ignore. 
  
Reconfiguration can be accomplished by (1) removing a faulty processor and 
hence reducing the level of redundancy or (2) by replacing the faulty processor 
with a spare processor.  These spares can be either hot or cold.  A hot spare is 
one which executes continuously in parallel with the processors which are 
currently in the working set.  The use of hot spares minimizes the reconfiguration 
time because the state of the spare is already loaded when it is needed.  
However, hot spares increase the amount of power consumed.  Also, the spare 
is subject to the same operating conditions as the working set processors and 
can fail just as the active ones.  A cold spare is powered off until it reconfigured 
into the working set.  Cold spares do not use power and are usually assumed to 
have a zero (or low) failure rate while inactive. 
 
Reconfiguration is used to increase the reliability of the system without adding 
more redundancy.  The effectiveness of this strategy depends upon how fast a 
faulty FCR can be removed from the system.  See section 17 (Reliability 
Analysis) for more details about this.   A more crude method of characterizing the 
level of fault-tolerance is the “N fault tolerant” terminology.  A “N fault tolerant” 
system is a system that is still operational after N consecutive faults (not 
simultaneous).  For example, a two fault tolerant (2 FT) system is a system that 
is "fail operational, fail operational", i.e. after two sequential faults, the system is 
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still a functioning system.   This definition implicitly assumes that there is 
adequate time for the system to reconfigure from the first fault before the arrival 
of the second fault. Without reconfiguration in a quad system, the arrival of the 
second fault can create a 2-2 dilemma case that can lead to directly to system 
failure.  For example, if the two good processors report that the Boolean variable 
release_parachute is true, while the two faulty processors report that the  
value is false, the voting logic could easily pick the wrong value. 
 
11 Transient Faults  
 
The reliability of a fault-tolerant system depends upon a reasonably fast detection 
of faults to ensure that two faults are not active at the same time.   The detection 
and removal of faults is complicated by the presence of transient faults.  Although 
a transient fault can corrupt the internal state of the system and must be handled, 
it does not permanently damage the hardware.  Therefore the recovery 
mechanism is different.  You want to restore the state of the memory but you do 
not want to remove hardware.   So the redundancy management system must 
make a judgment about whether a fault is permanent or transient.  
11.1 Distinguishing Transient Faults from Permanent Faults 
 
 There are two basic techniques: 
• If error persists, declare the fault to be permanent 
• Reconfigure a faulty component immediately upon indication of failure, run 
built in test (BIT) diagnostics, and then re-integrate if it passes the BIT 
diagnostics. 
 
When using the first technique, the designer has to decide on an appropriate 
time period (or an error count level) before declaring a fault to be permanent 
rather than transient.  Surprisingly the reliability of a typical N-modular redundant 
(NMR) system is not very sensitive to this parameter. Even a delay of a few 
minutes does not degrade the system reliability [DiVito90].  
 
11.2  Transient Fault Recovery  
 
Even though a fault is transient, it can still corrupt memory.  The process of 
correcting memory errors is sometimes called scrubbing. 
 
Several approaches can be used to recover the state of memory in a transiently 
affected digital processor.  The most common method is through the use of error-
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correcting codes (ECC) which take advantage of extra bits in the memory.6   
Another approach is to rely on the reading of new inputs to replace corrupted 
memory. Of course, this does not give 100% coverage over the space of 
potential memory upsets, but it is much more effective than one might expect at 
first glance. Since control-law implementations produce outputs as a function of 
periodic inputs and a relatively small internal state, a large fraction of the memory 
upsets can be recovered in this manner. This accounts for the fact that although 
many systems in service are not designed to accommodate transient faults, they 
do actually exhibit some ability to tolerate such faults. 
 
Another important technique is the use of a watchdog timer. Since a transient 
fault can (and frequently does) affect the program counter (PC), a processor can 
end up executing in an entirely inappropriate place -- even in the data space. If 
this happens, then the previous technique becomes totally inoperative. The only 
hope in this situation is to recognize that the PC is corrupted. A watchdog timer is 
a countdown register that sets the PC to a pre-determined “restart" location if the 
timer ever counts down all the way to 0. In a non-transiently affected processor, 
the watchdog timer is periodically reset by the operating system. Once a fault has 
been detected by a watchdog timer, the entire system may be “rolled-back" to a 
previous state by use of a checkpoint -- a previous dump of the dynamic memory 
state to a secondary storage device of some kind. This technique has not been 
used very often in flight control systems because of the unacceptable overhead 
of this type of operation. 
 
A more appropriate technique is the use of majority-voting to replace the internal 
state of a processor. It is important to note that this is done continuously rather 
than just after a transient fault is detected. Of course, such voting can be 
expensive if the dynamic state is not small.   The use of hardware-based 
memory-management units (MMUs) can also mitigate the impact of transient 
faults by containing the propagation of an error to within a single memory-
mapped region. 
 
12 Self-Checking Pairs 
 
A fault-tolerant system can be built on the foundation of self-checking pairs.  The 
use of self-checking pairs brings several key advantages, but this is not without 
some additional cost.   The key benefit is that self-checking pairs can greatly 
simplify the design of certain aspects of the system by providing a high 
probability that faults will manifest themselves as “fail-stop”.  However, this 
comes at the price of a more inefficient reconfiguration process which wastes 
more good hardware than the more traditional NMR approach. 
 
                                                 
6 Single Error Correction Double Error Code (SECDEC) is commonly used for spacecraft 
systems.  However, the processor’s internal caches often do not have this level of correction. 
Periodic cache flush is sometimes used or a flush on error detect is employed.  
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The basic idea of a self-checking pair (SCP) is to combine two identical  
processing elements which are given identical inputs and their results are 
compared.   If there is a mis-compare of their outputs, then the comparator circuit 
shuts-down the SCP and prevents the output from leaving the SCP.   This can be 
a temporary shutdown (e.g. the current output only) or a permanent shutdown.   
Because it is usually not desirable to permanently remove a SCP due to a 
transient fault, a persistence counter can be used which delays permanent 
shutdown until a number of consecutive faults have occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To achieve system-level fault-tolerance, self-checking pairs must be organized 
together so that when a self-checking pair shuts itself down, its function can be 
taken over by another self-checking pair.  Conceptually, this can be pictured as 
follows: 
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This type of architecture is often referred to as Dual-Dual.  The key advantage of 
this strategy is that it provides low level, autonomous processor fault detection 
and isolation.  There is no need to design voting mechanisms and high-level 
strategies for redundancy management. 
 
Of course there must be some mechanism to handle the transition from one self-
checking pair to another.   Under the assumption that a self-checking pair fail 
stops, the bus can just accept the first broadcast from either one of the pairs or 
search for a valid output in some pre-determined order.  Alternatively one of the 
pairs can be active while the other one “shadows” the active one.  Either way you 
are employing four-fold redundancy to avoid the problem of loading the data 
state after the primary fails. But of course this only takes care of faults in the 
processing element.  What about failures in the connection from the processor to 
the bus?  To deal with these failures we need something more sophisticated – 
bus guardian units (see next section). 
 
Although systems designed with self-checking pairs require more redundancy 
than a corresponding NMR approach, the software that manages the redundancy 
is much simpler.  Significant cost savings may accrue from not having to design 
detection and isolation mechanisms and from the reduced software verification 
and validation effort. 
13 Bus Guardian Units 
 
A bus guardian unit protects the inter-processor communication channels (e.g. 
bus) from transmission faults.  A bus guardian can also serve a “repeater 
function” to strengthen the signal from a processor and thereby protect the bus 
from signals that are degraded and potentially ambiguous.  The bus guardian unit 
protects the system from the “babbling idiot” phenomena where a failed 
transmitter floods the communication subsystem with illegal transmissions.  
When the communication mechanism is a time-division multiplex bus, the bus 
guardian protects the bus by preventing a transmission outside of its pre-
determined time slot and thus providing fail-silence of the self-checking pair and 
its connection to the bus. 
 
A fundamental challenge in designing a system using bus guardian units and 
time-division multiplex communication is to provide a consistent time-source to all 
of the bus guardian units so that they can provide properly enforce the time-slot 
for its self-checking pair.  This time must be synchronized with all of the rest of 
the other bus guardian units and so in many modern fault-tolerant systems, a 
fault-tolerant clock signal is generated in the communications subsystem and 
provided to the bus-guardian units and processor pairs.  Clearly the bus guardian 
unit cannot be triggered off of its own local processors clock.    A single failure in 
this clock would enable the processing pair and bus guardian unit to access the 
bus at an illegal time. 
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The bus guardian unit must protect the bus from any transmission outside of its 
allocated time slot, while not keeping the self-checking pair from transmitting at  
correct times.  Because the fault-tolerant clock signal cannot be assumed to be 
perfect, the bus guardian must open the window slightly earlier than the 
start of the time slot, and close it slightly later than the expected end of 
its time slot.  The system designer must be careful to make sure that these small 
excesses do not overlap with the excesses of other units.   So there has to be 
some wasted bandwidth of the bus to achieve fault-tolerance this way.  The 
selection of these time intervals must be analyzed carefully to insure that the 
system functions properly.  
 
14 Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) 
 
Physical separation of critical avionics functions from less critical functions has 
been the primary strategy used by the designers of civil aircraft to produce safe 
avionic systems.  Traditional avionics systems are built around federated 
architectures in which each processing site contains a single application such as 
an autopilot, flight management system, or display.  Typically, each application is 
assigned a single level of criticality and all software and hardware at that 
processing site is verified and certified to that level of criticality.  Critical functions 
are protected from non-critical tasks by physical isolation.  NASA has used this 
approach on interplanetary spacecraft, where functions critical to the survival of 
the spacecraft are handled by an attitude and articulation control system that is 
separate from the systems that control the science experiments. 
 
Physical separation of criticality in avionics, however, is a costly approach.  Each 
piece of hardware must be separately supported and maintained.  Furthermore, 
each of these functions (hardware/software) is certified in isolation; there is no 
notion of a common hardware platform that has been certified and can thus be 
used for multiple functions.  The concept of a certified reusable computer 
(probably multi-processor) that could execute multiple applications with different 
levels of criticality is commonly referred to as Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA). 
Because of the utilization of IMA in the Civil Aviation Industry, information is 
available about IMA application in safety-critical systems.   IMA may also have 
some special advantages for space applications, where power, weight, and 
volume are of particular concern.   By hosting many applications on the same 
platform, some of which run at different times than others, the total amount of 
hardware needed can be reduced and consequently there will be weight and 
volume savings and perhaps some power savings as well. 
 
14.1  ARINC 653 
 
The API (ARINC 653) defines an APplication EXecutive (APEX) for space and 
time partitioning that is gaining support in the commercial avionics markets.  
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Several vendors currently offer ARINC 653 compliant real-time operating 
systems including the LynxOS®-178 RTOS, Green Hills Integrity-178, 
VxWorks653, and the BAE Systems CsLEOS, the first two of which have been 
used and certified under the FAA’s DO-178B guidelines.  Each partition in an 
ARINC 653 system represents a separate application and makes use of memory 
space that is dedicated to it.  Similarly, the APEX allots a dedicated time slice to 
each, thus creating time partitioning. Each ARINC 653 partition supports 
multitasking.   The advantages are:  
• Uses a simple approach to memory and time partitioning and provides 
support for common I/O through a well-defined application program interface 
(API). 
• Simplified maintenance through the ability to modify or add hardware without 
impacting application software. 
• Enhanced safety assurance through software fault isolation.   For example, 
software faults in one partition cannot corrupt the memory space in another 
partition or impact the timing of another partition. 
• Better use of computing resources (as compare to federated system) results 
in reduction of mass and power 
• Scalable: the centralized processing function can be distributed in multiple 
computers (cabinets) 
 
It should also be noted that a fault-tolerant operating system can provide different 
levels of fault tolerance on the same platform.  The tasks can be dispatched at 
different levels of redundancy.  Some tasks can run as simplex tasks while others 
may be triplex or higher. 
 
15 Protecting a System from Common Cause Faults 
 
There are some failure mechanisms than can impact multiple fault containment 
regions all at once and can thus create multiple errors in these separate regions 
at the same time.   These kinds of faults are often referred to as common cause 
faults (CCF) or generic faults and the associated phenomena is sometimes 
referred to as common mode failure.  We will use the term common cause fault 
exclusively to prevent confusion.  Because common cause faults can completely 
undermine a fault-tolerant system, system designers give considerable attention 
to this class of faults.  
 
15.1  Types of Common Cause Faults 
 
Sources of common cause faults are many and varied and require different 
mitigation strategies. Examples that can lead to common cause failure are: 
 
• Logic errors in software (i.e. programming bugs, requirements oversights) 
• Hardware logic errors (i.e. bug in the instruction set of a  processor) 
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• Compiler/loader programming error 
• Manufacturing defects  
• Environmental induced effects (i.e. MMOD, Lightning, EMI, total dose 
radiation) 
• A Byzantine asymmetric fault in a system not designed to handle such 
faults 
 
A valuable resource for learning more about CCF is the SAE ARP 4761, which 
outlines guidelines for conducting safety assessment for civil airborne systems. 
This standard enumerates a total of eight common mode types, twenty two 
common mode subtypes with between two and nine example sources for each 
subtype. Due to the breadth of this topic, it cannot possibly be covered 
completely in this report, but some brief mitigation strategies are given as 
examples. 
 
15.2  Software Common Cause 
 
Software common cause can be addressed through rigorous verification and test 
methods which seek to discover and remove potential errors before the system is 
placed in operation.  Software dissimilarity is another technique that has been 
advocated to address software CCF.  The use of dissimilarity at the code level 
has been discredited (Knight-Leveson)7. However, at the requirements level 
where a completely different function or approach can be specified, this is 
deemed by most experts generally to be a good idea. Another method that can 
provide some mitigation of software common cause errors is the use of restarts 
and retries though the latter can sometimes be complicated by the need for some 
rollback mechanism. The hope is that after the restart, the software will not 
traverse through exactly the same set of inputs that triggered the software bug, 
because the system will be processing new sensor values.  Software errors can 
also result from compiler design errors.  However, these errors are less common 
due to the heritage of the compilers and a large user base which tends to weed 
out the bugs in the field.  Probably the most promising of all approaches is formal 
                                                 
7 It has been demonstrated that even independently-developed software versions can fail on the same input.  
In fact the probability that this occurs was shown to be much greater than one would expect (i.e. the 
independence assumption is false) [Leveson].  It is believed that low-level design diversity (e.g. often 
called software fault tolerance) is more vulnerable to this problem than high-level design diversity.   .  
Because design diversity does not provide a strong guarantee against common mode failure, a combination 
of all the approaches is highly recommended.  In the most critical systems and subsystems the use of formal 
verification is prudent, even though it is may impose higher early life cycle costs.    
 
Both N-version programming techniques and recovery block schemes have been proposed as code-level 
mechanisms. For an excellent tutorial on software fault tolerance see [Pomales00].  Recovery blocks  are 
based around the idea of an acceptance test.  If the output of a module fails the acceptance test, a backup 
software routine is used to produce the output.   N-version programming relies on multiple versions of a 
program created by different programming teams.  All versions are created from the same specification so 
that the outputs can be voted.   
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methods.  Formal methods are able to mathematically establish the absence of 
hazardous behavior over all possible inputs using formal proof (using theorem 
provers) or exhaustive search (using model checkers).   
 
15.3  Design Errors in Hardware 
 
Design errors in hardware (i.e processors, ASICs, FPGAs) are also possible. 
These types of errors generally have lower failure rates than software errors 
because of the lower complexity and more rigorous verification culture present in 
the hardware industry.  Adding hardware dissimilarity is a method that mitigates 
this class of error, but this can easily be “straining at a gnat”.  The author knows 
of no loss of a safety-critical system due to a design error in the hardware.  
Whereas the loss of safety-critical systems due to errors in the application 
software are quite numerous.    Is should also be noted that adding dissimilarity 
to a redundant computing system can actually increase the probability that it fails 
due to CCF.   Whenever redundancy is added to a system, additional logic (in 
hardware/software) must be created to manage that redundancy.  Mistakes in 
that logic can be catastrophic –- creating a new single point of failure.  So 
dissimilarity is no panacea.  It should be used with the utmost of care and 
probably only where there is a commitment to formally prove the managing logic. 
 
15.4  Radiation Induced Common Cause Failure 
 
The impact of radiation on spacecraft electronics can be dramatic.  For example, 
in September 2005 a solar flare upset the ROSETTA spacecraft electronics 
leaving the primary star tracker function in INIT mode and the secondary Star 
Tracker in standby mode.   
 
Radiation can cause single-event upsets (SEUs) such as memory bit-flips or 
transients on clock or data lines.  SEUs do not cause permanent damage but can 
cause data and/or code corruption that can lead to functional upsets.  Permanent 
damage can result from single event latch-up (SEL) event.  A SEL event can 
activate a parasitic low-impedance path between the power supply rails of an 
electronic component (which acts as a short circuit) and cause displacement 
effects (i.e. the cumulative effect of displacing atoms out of their lattice, which 
can destroy the device).  A third radiation effect is accumulated total incident 
dose (TID). As TID accumulates in electronic components (over months or years) 
transistor parameters can shift and eventually lead to device failure . Pritchard 
et.al. [Pritchard02] list the following NASA missions which were adversely 
impacted by radiation effects including (1) TOPEX-Poseidon (permanent failure 
of optocouplers), (2) Cassini (solid-state recorder errors), (3) Deep Space 1 
(Latchup in stellar reference unit, upset in solar panel control electronics), (4) 
QuikScat (GPS receiver failure, 1553 bus lockups), (5) Mars Odyssey (entered 
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safe mode due to  processor reset caused by latch upset in DRAM) and (6) 
GRACE (Resets, reboots, double-bit errors in MMU-A, some GPS errors). 
 
Although redundancy is helpful to some extent, a serious radiation event can 
impact a majority of the FCRs and defeat the architectural-level fault-tolerance.   
Therefore classic architectural-level fault-tolerance must be augmented with 
other strategies for spacecraft.  The primary methods are 
• Use of radiation hardened parts and materials. (This reduces TID, can 
effectively eliminate SEL, and improves SEU susceptibility)  
• Latch-up detection and device reset 
• Low-level Error Detection and Correction (EDAC) mechanisms such as 
memory ECC (See Section 11.2 “Transient Fault Recovery”). 
• Use of shielding (This is primarily used to reduce TID effects, but can have 
some impact on low energy particles that can result in SEUs). 
• Low-level rewriting of the control state in hardware (e.g. rewriting of mode 
registers in SDRAMS.) 
• On-chip redundancy. (TMR is common in space-qualified FPGAs) 
• Device-level redundancy (e.g, multiple processors configured as a TMR  
within a single board computer.) 
• Use of self-stabilization algorithms. (A distributed algorithm is self-
stabilizing if, starting from an arbitrary state, it is guaranteed to converge 
to an operational state within a bounded amount of time.)  
 
15.5  Other Common Cause Faults 
 
Common cause manufacturing defects can be partially mitigated through 
redundancy and fault tolerant techniques depending on their manifestation. 
Screening and inspection can also identify manufacturing defects before system 
deployment. Part defects can be mitigated through dissimilarity. Sometimes 
manufacturing defect manifestation is due to the environment (physical stress, 
temperature, radiation etc.). Therefore testing in appropriate environments helps 
to identify some defects. 
 
Common cause power related problems are worthy of special mention.  Because 
there are often significant constraints on mass and cable length, fault 
containment regions share the redundant power lanes. Therefore if a power fault 
occurs, multiple FCRs (from a defect or data transfer perspective) can be 
affected. Also NASA has a history of power related faults, making it appropriate 
for extra scrutiny. Parts screening, derating, testing and careful fault containment 
analysis and design help mitigate this class of fault. 
 
A final example that can lead to common cause failure is due to the vibration and 
shock loads of a launch or reentry. The harshness of these environments needs 
to be carefully analyzed and designed for with ample margin for uncertainty. 
Fault containment through physical separation and isolation are mitigation 
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strategies. Also, environmental testing can identify problems that may not be 
identified by system modeling.  
15.6  Functional-level Dissimilar Backup System 
 
Sometimes safety-critical systems are designed with a completely independent 
backup system.   The Space Shuttle for example has a primary system that is a 
quadraplex and a fifth dissimilar computer that serves as a backup.   This backup 
system has never been used, but has provided a level of comfort to the 
astronauts and the operators.   Typically a backup system is an extremely simple 
system that provides only basic functionality.  .  It is usually programmed with 
different software from the primary system and provides just enough functionality 
to get the crew home safely.  Simplicity in the hardware (i.e. reduced part count) 
reduces the fault arrive rate and hence makes it more reliable. Simple software 
reduces the software defect rate and potentially enables formal verification. 
 
The process that governs the switchover to the backup system is of critical 
importance.   You cannot have the backup unilaterally takeover, because it may 
do so improperly when it has failed.   And the failure rate of the simplex backup 
system is much higher than the primary fault-tolerant system.  Of course it is 
reasonable to allow the primary system to give control to the backup, but this 
cannot be relied upon for all situations.  Therefore inevitably, the switchover 
process must involve the human operator.  But it should be remembered that the 
effectiveness of this strategy depends upon the ability of the astronauts to 
recognize the need for and accomplish the switchover to the backup in adequate 
time.   
  
Adding hardware dissimilarity is one method that mitigates common cause 
failure. But as noted previously, additional redundancy should always be added 
judiciously and complexity must be carefully managed. For example, adding a 
dissimilar backup to a primary redundant computing system can help mitigate 
common cause failure, but system designers must carefully understand how 
control is passed from primary to backup. Unintended results could occur if a 
fault in the backup system enables it to take control from a perfectly good primary 
system.  Design error in the system level redundancy management logic is one 
class of common cause failure that can only be mitigated through rigorous design 
assurance techniques. 
 
Before a backup system is given control, the backup has to be initialized with all 
of the relevant program state.   Sometimes the backup system is run as a hot 
spare and performs all of the same calculations as the primary system, only its 
outputs are not sent to the system actuators.  If the backup is “cold” it has to be 
loaded with appropriate code and data prior to being given control. 
 
The cost of a backup system can be considerable given that different software 
has to be written for it.  Also the backup system must be connected to the 
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input/output communications systems or have its own set of sensors and 
actuators. 
 
15.7  Common Cause Failure and Integrated Modular Avionics 
 
The impact of IMA on the problem of common cause failure is a complicated 
issue: 
• The use of IMA creates a higher potential for common mode failure due to 
the extensive use of common hardware modules and a common operating 
system, but 
• The ready availability of partitions provides a tool to the application 
designer to isolate the impact of insidious software bugs to smaller 
regions.  A divide-by-zero error may temporarily halt one function but will 
not impact all of the others. 
It is the author’s opinion that IMA can provide a net gain in the area of common 
mode failure.   The following factors mitigate the unique risks associated with 
IMA: 
• Historically processor design errors have not resulted in catastrophic 
failure. 
• Several IMA operating systems are being designed in accordance with the 
FAA’s DO-178B software standard.  
• More rigorous verification techniques such as formal methods can be 
deployed because the cost is amortized over many different applications 
and vehicles. 
• The IMA operating systems will become increasingly reliable as they are 
deployed in aerospace applications and millions of operational hours flush 
out the bugs with very low fault arrival rates. 
 
 
16 Re-Usable Fault Tolerance and System Layering 
 
Many fault-tolerant computer systems have been built with voting strategies that 
utilize information about the applications.  Although at first this may seem like a 
good thing to do, i.e. we might as well use the maximum information available to 
detect faults, it turns out that this is really very counter-productive.  The problem 
is that one cannot verify and validate the fault-tolerant aspects of the system 
without the applications.   There is no divide-and-conquer approach that can 
simplify the verification and validation.   The aviation industry has frequently used 
application-level fault-tolerance in the design of their flight control systems.  
Interestingly they have largely avoided this approach in the design of fault-
tolerant flight management systems.  Here architectures based upon self-
checking pairs are frequently employed.  
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16.1 Asynchronous Flight Control Systems 
 
Asynchronous digital fault-tolerant flight control systems arose in the 1980s.  
They exploit the fact that the control laws that run on them are periodic in nature 
and that they sample inputs and produce actuator outputs.  Therefore, if the 
channels are allowed to drift apart (i.e. no clock synchronization), then they will 
never really drift more than the sample period apart (e.g. 40 ms), because once 
they get a full frame apart the channels are once again sampling the sensors at 
the same time. 
 
Voting in an asynchronous architecture is built around the idea that the rate of 
change of output value is bounded and that the sensor data can be separated in 
time by no more the period of the sample rate.   This is illustrated below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore the error between the outputs is:  
 
      Tf  max (df/dt)  
 
where Tf = sensor sample period, and max (df/dt) = the maximum rate of change 
of the output function.  If the control laws are stable then the output differences 
will be bounded if the input differences are bounded.  Using these bounds, 
thresholds can be set at the voters.  The mid-value from the channels is used to 
drive the actuators and if the difference between an output and the mid-value 
exceeds the threshold then the channel is declared as failed. 
 
But eventually the designers have to deal with the fact that the control laws have 
state variables associated with them (e.g. integrator variables).  So although the 
input variables are re-aligned once a channel drifts a full period apart, the 
integrator variables are one iteration step apart!  So inevitably in these 
architectures the designers end up using cross-channel strapping and data 
synchronization techniques.  So this is typically handled by performing data 
synchronization at the application level.  For example Y.C. Yeh of the Boeing 
Commercial Aircraft Company describes how this is done for the Boeing 777: 
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 “The potential for functional asymmetry, which can lead to disagreement 
among digital computing systems, is dealt with via frame and data 
synchronization and median value selection of the PFC’s output 
commands”  [] 
 
So although the original design was built around the concept of no clock 
synchronization between the channels, they end up synchronizing anyway.  But, 
instead of solving this problem at a lower level of the system in an application-
independent way, the problem is solved at the application level while dealing with 
a lot of other issues.  In other words, there is no separation of concerns.  It is 
possible to defer the issue of synchronizing the channels, but eventually this 
issue must be at solved at some higher level of the system. 
         
The whole strategy for diagnosing failed channels is based upon bounded rates 
of change of the output values.  But what happens when there is a discrete 
change or a mode change?  Well this could lead to an erroneous diagnosis of a 
channel failure.  So another ad-hoc solution is patched onto the architecture--   
the channel outputs are passed through an output filter which ramps up and 
ramps down the actuator outputs in a way that bounds the rate of change.  These 
ramps also serve to smooth out any rapid change of an output to an actuator. 
 
So the designers are essentially dealing with the lack of clock synchronization  
using a suite of ad-hoc patches.  But there is no separation of concerns, no 
divide and conquer and thus one ends up with an extremely complex architecture 
that is difficult to validate and test.  Dale Mackell wrote about this problem after 
Dryden had flight tested the asynchronous F-16 DFCS, “The fault-tolerant design 
should also be transparent to the control law functions.  The control laws should 
not have to be tailored to the system’s redundancy level.”  [Mackall88]  
 
There are some additional concerns associated with mid-value select algorithms.  
Because the channel outputs are not identical even in fault-free conditions, 
exact-match voting cannot be used.  A mid value select algorithm must be used, 
but mid value select algorithms cannot be used for diagnosis because they do 
not decide which of the other two channels are faulty. Therefore, thresholds 
based upon dynamics must also be employed for fault diagnosis.  But this is not 
as good a fault detector as an exact match voter. A permanently faulty processor 
may remain undiagnosed for a long time, e.g. if it “flat lines” between two good 
channels.  So fault latency increases and this impacts the reliability analysis. Also 
where to set the thresholds is fundamentally a trial-and-error process.  These 
thresholds change as the control laws change.  It is not unusual for the control 
laws to be modified at integration testing when the vehicle dynamics are better 
understood.  System designers have to wait until they have a full-scale simulation 
(e.g. iron-bird) to debug the fault-tolerance of the system. But this means that the 
basic fault-tolerance design is being modified at integration time as well.  What 
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should be an early-life cycle, low level activity is deferred until late in the life-cycle 
when repair of errors are notoriously expensive to repair.   
16.2  Synchronous Fault-Tolerant Systems 
 
 A synchronous fault-tolerant system is built on the foundation of a fault-
tolerant clock synchronization algorithm which can keep all of the good 
processor’s clocks within a small skew of each other, often denoted as ε.  This 
foundation enables all of the good processors or processes to be exact replicas 
of each other.  A simple timing protocol suffices.  Because all non-faulty 
processors or processes are exact replicas, exact match voting is used to both 
mask faults and detect failed components.  Interactive consistency algorithms 
(see Section 6 “Interactive Consistency”) are used to distribute single source 
data (such as sensor data) to the replicas in a way that guarantees that all  good 
processors receive the exact same value even  in the presence of faults.  As long 
as 3f+1 FCRs (processors and/or interstages) are non-faulty, f faults can be 
tolerated.  Finally a distributed diagnosis algorithm is used to identify faulty 
components.  
 Because the management of redundancy can be done independently of 
the applications (using exact-match voting), a layered approach to the system 
design is possible as illustrated below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many cost-saving and safety benefits accrue from this approach.  First, the 
application software can be designed by a different vendor than the one building 
the fault-tolerant computing platform.  This prevents the government from getting 
locked into a single large vendor.  Second, the software can be developed as if it 
were running on a single ultra-reliable operating system.  It can be tested and 
verified independently from the fault-tolerant system.  Third, the fault-tolerant 
computing platform can be reused over many different applications.   The fault-
tolerant computing platform can be highly configurable and scalable supporting 
different safety and reliability goals.  Fourth, the redundancy management 
algorithms can be designed in a processor-independent manner which enables 
the use of COTS processors that won’t lock you into an antiquated hardware 
technology.   The following characteristics of the redundancy management layer 
are highly desirable: 
• Fault-masking, fault detection, and reconfiguration are independent of the 
applications software 
Redundant processors + interconnect
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• The redundancy management should be handled in a processor-
independent way (either via software or via small custom hardware that 
interfaces to COTS processors) 
• The redundancy management should be highly configurable allowing 
some processes to run in triplex, some as simplex, some as dual-dual etc. 
• The redundancy management should support low power modes, allowing 
systems to be turned on and off without interruption of critical applications 
and processes. 
• The redundancy management should provide a standard interface so that 
multiple IMA operating systems could be supported. 
 
Sometimes it is argued that a synchronous system is more vulnerable to 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) or single-event upset (SEU) than an 
asynchronous system.  But a strategy that can be helpful is to schedule the 
redundant tasks so that they run at different times: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.3  Maintaining Independence between the applications and 
the fault-tolerant mechanisms 
 
Many fault-tolerant systems that are deployed today are not reusable because 
the fault-tolerance mechanisms used in these systems are intimately connected 
to the specific applications that run on them.   If the applications are changed, 
then the fault-tolerance mechanisms must be changed as well.    
 
To enable reuse, the fault-tolerant system’s methods for detecting and 
reconfiguring in the presence of physical faults should not be dependent upon 
the application software. In particular, the system should not be design using 
threshold voting.  Rationale for this is: 
• Threshold voting based on control software characteristics defers 
validation of the fundamental fault tolerance until integration testing (late 
life cycle). 
• The thresholds have to be changed as the controls are changed and so 
we have a serious maintenance and configuration management problem. 
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• Threshold voting based on application software characteristics leads to 
false alarms because of uncertainty in the cause of a threshold being 
exceeded (e.g. did vehicle dynamics change or was it a processor fault). 
• Exact match voting detects errors without regard to the nature of the 
applications. 
• Exact match voting can be validated early in the life cycle. 
• Exact match voting can be used in conjunction with BIT to provide 100% 
fault masking and high probability of a timely reconfiguration. 
• You do not have to artificially ramp-up/ramp-down outputs to make sure 
that voting thresholds won’t be exceeded during non-linear actions such 
as mode switching. 
• You do not have to introduce cross-channel synchronization of integrator 
values because the interactive consistency algorithms used will maintain a 
globally consistent state on all good processors. 
• Diagnosis of faulty processors, memories, and I/O resources is not 
confounded by uncertainty over whether the fault is due to computational 
resource failure or due to failure in an external vehicle system or actuator 
that is affecting the thresholds. 
 
The fault-tolerant system should be developed in a layered systems approach 
with well-defined APIs between the layers.  It should reside in a layer below 
the applications and create an interface that provides an abstraction that 
hides the redundancy and voting from the higher layers to the maximum 
extent possible. 
16.4  Technology Obsolescence and Refresh 
 
The fault-tolerance used in most avionics systems today is not easily updated by 
new technology.  Because much of the timing and voting in the system is 
handled by the processors themselves and depends upon specific aspects of 
these processors, they cannot be easily updated with more capable processors.  
The fault-tolerant system must be designed with this goal in mind and carefully 
configured to avoid these dependencies.  The SPIDER is a modern architecture 
that has been designed with this as a primary goal [Geser02].  See 
http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/spider/ for details about this fault-tolerant 
system. 
 
17 Reliability Analysis 
 
Since fault tolerance seeks to increase the reliability of a system through 
redundancy it is important to be able to compute the reliability of a fault-tolerant 
system as a function of measurable parameters such as processor failure rates 
and system recovery rates.   
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17.1  Markov Models 
 
Markov analysis is a powerful mathematical approach that accomplishes this 
goal. The Markov model shown in Figure 1 describes the behavior of a simple 
degradable quadraplex system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Reliability model for a degradable quadraplex system. 
 
 
The states of the system are labeled with two digits.  The first digit denotes the 
number of processors that are currently being voted.  The second digit denotes 
the number of faulty processors in the system.  The system starts in state 40, 
where all four active processors participate in the vote and none of them are 
faulty.  Anyone of these processors can fail, which takes the system to state 41 
at rate 4λ, where λ represents the single processor failure rate.   Because the 
processors are identical, the failure of each processor is not represented with a 
separate transition.  For example, at state (41), the system has one failed 
processor but there is no delineation as to which processor has failed and so the 
total rate of reaching this state is 4λ. Here, the system analyzes the errors from 
the voter and diagnoses the problem. The transition from state (41) to state (30) 
represents the removal (reconfiguration) of the faulty processor.  The 
reconfiguration transitions are labeled with a distribution function (Fr(t)) rather 
than a rate. The reason for this labeling is that experimental measurement of the 
reconfiguration process has revealed that the distribution of recovery time is 
usually not exponential.  Consequently, the transition is not described by a 
constant rate. This label indicates that the probability that the transition time from 
state (41) to state (30) will be less than t is Fr (t). The presence of a non-
exponential transition generalizes the mathematical model to the class of semi-
Markov models.  At state (30), the system is operational with three good 
processors. The recovery transition from state (41) to state (30) occurs as long 
as a second processor does not fail before the diagnosis is complete.  Otherwise, 
the voter could not distinguish the good results from the bad. Thus, a second 
transition exists from state (41) to state (42), which represents the situation 
where two out of the four processors have failed and are still participating in the 
  40 41 42
30 31 32
10 11
4λ 3λ
λ
3λ 2λ
Fr(t)
Fr(t)
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vote. The rate of this transition is 3 λ, because any of the remaining three 
processors could fail. State (42) is a death state (an absorbing state) that 
represents failure of the system due to coincident faults. It is labeled in red to 
indicate system failure. Of course, this is a conservative assumption. Although 
two out of the four processors have failed, the failed processors may not produce 
errors at the same time nor in the same place in memory. In this case, the voting 
mechanism may effectively mask both faults and the reliability of the system 
would be better than the model predicts. 
 
At state (30), the system is operational with three good processors and no faulty 
processors in the active configuration. Either one of these processors may fail 
and take the system to state (31). At state (31), once again, a race occurs 
between the reconfiguration process that ends in state (10) and the 
failure of a second processor that ends in state (32). The recovery distribution 
from state (31) could easily be different from the recovery distribution from state 
(41) to state (30). However, for simplicity it is assumed to be the same. State (32) 
is thus another death state and state (10) is the operational state where one 
good processor remains.  In this case the system was not designed to operate as 
a dual so the system degrades to a simplex here.  The transition from state (10) 
to state (11) represents the failure of the last processor. At state (11) no good 
processors remain, and the probability of reaching this death state is 
often referred to as failure by exhaustion of parts. 
17.2  Solution of a Markov Model  
 
The mathematical solution of a Markov model involves the solution of a system of 
linear differential equations often referred to as the Chapman Kolmogorov 
equations.  Because the analytic solution becomes unwieldy as the number of 
states is increased, numerical approaches for solving Markov models has been 
pursued.   Several programs have been developed at NASA Langley to solve 
Markov and semi-Markov models (a generalization) numerically:  SURE, PAWS, 
STEM and ASSIST and their Windows versions WinSURE, WinSTEM, and 
WinASSIST8.   These programs are approved for public release and available for 
free.  See http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/people/rwb/rel.html for information about 
how to obtain them. 
 
The SURE program is a program for solving semi-Markov models useful in 
describing the fault-handling behavior of fault-tolerant computer systems 
[Butler88, Butler92, Butler95].  The only modeling restriction imposed by the 
program is that the nonexponential recovery transitions must be fast in 
comparison to the mission time—a desirable attribute of all fault-tolerant 
                                                 
8 The SURE and WinSURE programs solve semi-Markov models.  A semi-Markov model is more general 
than a pure Markov model in that it allows non-exponential transitions.  The SURE program requires the 
mean and standard deviation for all of the non-exponential distributions.  The PAWS and STEM programs 
accept the same input language as SURE, but they assume that all transitions are exponentially distributed.  
The exponential rate is derived from the specified mean. 
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systems.   The PAWS and STEM programs accept the model input in exactly the 
same format as the SURE program.   They assume that all of the recovery 
transitions are exponential because they are pure Markov solvers.  The ASSIST 
program is a tool that generates large models for SURE, STEM, or PAWS 
[Johnson95]. 
 
The model shown in figure 1 can be described in the SURE input language as 
follows: 
 
LAMBDA = 3E-6;        (* processor failure rate per hour *) 
REC_TIME = 1/3600;    (* 1 second recovery time *) 
 
40,41 = 4*LAMBDA; 
41,42 = 3*LAMBDA; 
41,30 = <REC_TIME, REC_TIME>; 
30,31 = 3*LAMBDA; 
31,32 = 2*LAMBDA; 
31,10 = <REC_TIME, REC_TIME>; 
10,11 = LAMBDA; 
TIME = 1;              (* Mission Time of 1 hour *) 
 
The SURE program produces the following output: 
 
 
                     LOWERBOUND        UPPERBOUND   
  --------------   --------------   --------------     
                   2.865386E-0014   3.005409E-0014 
 
The upper and lower bounds are due to numerical inaccuracy. 
 
17.3  The Impact of Long Mission Times 
 
Redundancy loses its effectiveness as the mission time increases.  As the 
mission time approaches the mean time between failure (MTBF), there is an 
increasing probability that multiple processors will have failed before the end of 
the mission.   For example suppose you have a non-reconfigurable quadraplex.  
This can be modeled as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SURE input is simply 
 
 
 40 41 424λ 3λ
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LAMBDA = 1E-5;           (* processor failure rate *) 
TIME = 10 TO+ 4000;      (* mission time *) 
1,2 = 4*LAMBDA; 
2,3 = 3*LAMBDA; 
 
The following logarithmic plot shows the dramatic impact of a large mission time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The WinSTEM output is 
 
    TIME            PROBABILITY        ACCURACY       
  -----------   -------------------    -------- 
  1.000E+0001   5.99860018498E-0008   14 DIGITS 
  1.000E+0002   5.98601848251E-0006   14 DIGITS 
  1.000E+0003   5.86183262937E-0004   13 DIGITS 
 
From this graph it is clear why the fault tolerance used in deep space missions is 
very different from that used in commercial aircraft.  In long mission scenarios, 
the designers focus on reducing the processor failure rate λ  and sometimes use 
cold spares. 
17.4   Beware of the Ambiguous Term “coverage” 
 
If you hang around reliability people for a while, you will inevitably encounter the 
term “coverage”.  Unfortunately the term is terribly ambiguous.  It is used in many 
different ways in different contexts.   In this section, four of the most common 
uses will be explained.  It is the author’s opinion that this term should be used 
with caution or totally avoided, because it is easily mis-interpreted. 
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First fault coverage: Some systems are not fully capable of surviving all first 
faults.  The percentage of first faults that they can recover from is often called 
coverage.   For example, suppose you have a dual system which runs a built-in 
test diagnostic with coverage C.  The following model describes this system: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The system starts in state 20 with two good processors.   State 21 represents the 
system after the arrival of a fault which the system cannot detect and hence 
mask so it is a death state.  State 10 represents the system after the arrival of a 
fault that is covered.  Here the system successfully removes the faulty processor 
and continues operation with one good processor.   The following table shows 
the dramatic impact of first fault coverage with a fixed λ = 1.0 x 10-5/hour: 
 
 
C Pf 
0.9999 2.1 x 10-9 
0.999 2.0 x 10-8 
0.99 2.0 x 10-7 
0.9 2.0 x 10-6 
0 2.0 x 10-5 
 
 
Detection coverage: Some systems are fully capable of masking all first faults but 
can only detect a fraction of the first faults.   Suppose we have an asynchronous 
quadraplex system that relies on threshold voting for detection.  Hence there can 
be some faults that remain latent because they do not propagate errors that 
violate the thresholds.  Suppose C represents the fraction of faults that are 
detectable by the threshold voters and the built-in test (BIT). This means that C 
percent of all faults will be detected and reconfigured out.  The following Markov 
model describes this quadraplex: 
 
20 10 11
2Cλ λ
21
2(1-C)λ
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Figure 2. Model of a degradable quadraplex voting system with C% of detectable faults. 
 
Notice that here the “uncovered” faults do not lead to system failure because 
they are outvoted (i.e. masked), but they do take the system to a state (i.e. 41u) 
where no reconfiguration transition is found.  
 
Second Fault coverage: Because some analysis tools are combinatorial in 
nature, they cannot solve a Markov model directly.  In these tools, the Markov 
reconfiguration process is modeled as a coverage.  For example, the following 
triplex system model:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is replaced by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where C represents the effectiveness of the reconfiguration process.  The 
advantage of course is that this model can now be solved combinatorially without 
the need to solve differential equations.  But unfortunately the C is not directly 
measurable.  It is a simply an artifact of the model reduction and combines many 
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concepts into one number.   It is the author’s opinion that this type of coverage 
should be avoided. 
 
BIT coverage: the fraction of the faults that can be detected by a Built-In-Test 
technique. (See Section 8.3 “Detection Using Built-in-Test (BIT)”). 
18 The Synergism Between Formal Verification and 
Reliability Analysis 
 
The question is often raised how do you prove that the reliability of the system is 
10-9?  The answer is that you decompose the problem into two components, one 
of which is answered by formal methods and the other which is answered by a 
numerical reliability analysis: 
 
Using formal methods one seeks to prove formulas of the form 
 
      Enough Good Hardware  ? SAFETY-PROPERTIES 
 
where the ? indicates logical implication.  The symbol “SAFETY-PROPERTIES” 
represents all the properties that must be true of the system if it is to avoid 
reaching some hazardous system state.   Using reliability analysis one calculates 
the probability 
 
Prob [Enough Good Hardware] 
 
Together these provide a basis for assuring the safety of the system. 
 
Formal methods also offers an approach to overcoming a serious dilemma for 
the reliability analyst, namely, how can I assure myself that the reliability model 
itself is a valid representation of the implemented system?  The key assumptions 
of the Markov model can be formally verified.  For example, a formal proof of the 
system’s fault tolerant operating system can be used to establish the absence of 
any direct transition from the fault-free state to a death state. 
 
19 Function Migration  
 
Though a fault-tolerant system is inherently a distributed processor system, 
systems designers need not identically schedule all of the applications on the 
available processors.  Spare processing power can be allocated as needed. In 
fact it is possible to move one function (including all replicates) from one set of 
processors to another.  This is often referred to as function migration or dynamic 
task allocation.   Function migration requires that a flexible communication 
scheme be employed that provides connections between all of the sensors and 
actuators and the processors. The application program code must be available to 
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all of the processors in the system.  This can be accomplished by providing 
access to a mass memory where all of the software codes are stored or by 
making copies of the codes on all of the local stores.   Often fault-tolerant 
systems rely on time-division multiplex buses that are driven by static schedule 
tables.  In these systems, function migration requires that there be some 
mechanism for updating these tables in a fault-tolerant and safe manner.   
 
Sometimes the distinction is made between 
•  Asymmetric multiprocessing: where specific processors can execute only 
certain task types, and 
• Symmetric multiprocessing: where any processor can execute any task.  
Symmetric multiprocessing enables each processor to be utilized to the fullest.  It 
is usually achieved through identical processors and full interconnection and a 
flexible operating system interface. 
 
20 Vehicle Health Management  
 
It is useful to distinguish faults that occur in the computing resources themselves 
from faults that occur in the subsystems that are external to the computing 
resources. This primer has concentrated on the mechanisms that handle failures 
in the computing resources.  The process of detecting, isolating and recovering 
from faults and failures in the external subsystems is referred to as Vehicle 
Health Management (VHM).   
20.1  Basic Concepts 
 
This is a huge topic in itself but a few observations about this topic will be 
provided here: 
1. The mechanisms that are used for FDIR (fault detection, isolation, and 
recovery) are very different from those used in the computing resources 
and are often based upon concepts from artificial intelligence. 
2. The VHM system is usually implemented as a software application that 
runs on the fault-tolerant computing system. 
3. The VHM system seeks to diagnose which external components have 
failed on the basis of observables. 
4. The scope of a VHM system can be huge including sensors, actuators, 
power systems, displays, thermal systems, landing gear, hydraulics, etc. 
5. The use of a single, unified approach to diagnose many different kinds of 
subsystem failures is usually referred to as Integrated Vehicle Health 
Management (IVHM). 
 
In some systems, the fault-tolerance mechanisms of the computing platform are 
included in the IVHM functionality.  It is the author’s opinion that this is generally 
a bad idea.  Since the IVHM system is a software application that inevitably 
executes on the computing resources, a layered approach is desirable and the 
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IVHM system should remain independent of lower-level redundancy 
management: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IVHM systems fall roughly into two categories: 
• Rule based 
• Model based 
 
In the more traditional rule-based approach, rules which associate symptoms 
with underlying faults are used to diagnose the system.  The model-based 
approach uses a model of the subsystem components which are given that same 
inputs as the system.  The outputs of the model are compared with the actual 
system outputs in real time.  If the output of the real system component differs 
significantly from its model, a failure of that component is indicated.  See 
[Davis88] for an excellent introduction to this topic. 
 
20.2  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
 
A number of tools and techniques have been developed to aid the system 
designer in the identification of hazards in safety-critical systems.  Some 
examples are (1) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), (2) Hazard and 
Operability Studies (HAZOP), and Deviation Analysis.  While performing an 
FMEA, the analyst creates a list of component failure modes and tries to deduce 
the effects of those failure modes on the system.  Then an assessment is made 
about the severity, the likelihood of these failures and the ability of the system to 
detect them.   Sometimes these factors are rolled up into a single risk priority 
number that is assigned to each identified failure mode.  This enables the 
designer to focus his attention on the most critical failure modes.  While this type 
of analysis can be applied to the low-level design of the computing platform 
components, it is most useful when applied to the vast array of components of 
the subsystems external to computing resources.  This type of analysis aids the 
designer of an IVHM system or the designer of application software which 
performs some local diagnosis and recovery from subsystem component failures.  
This analysis aids the designer in identifying the critical component failures and 
helps him develop mechanisms to handle these failures.  For more information 
about FMEA, the reader is referred to [Dailey04]. 
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20.3  Sensor Fault Tolerance 
 
Fault-tolerant control systems periodically sample inputs from the environment 
and produce outputs which are sent to the actuators.   Although it is possible for 
each application task to directly sample sensors and seek to mask sensor 
failures appropriately, many fault-tolerant systems separate this functionality into 
a separate application task.   In aerospace application this function has often 
been handled in a separate computer called the flight data computer.   In an 
integrated modular avionics system, this function is typically allocated to a 
separate partition.  In either case, for every measurement needed, a single value 
must be extracted from a set of redundant sensor values, which can then be 
made available to the application software for processing.   Sensor failures must 
be detected and factored into this selection process.   Sensor failure can be 
detected with local algorithms and/or by a separate IVHM system.    
 
Due to the criticality of the sensor selection software it must also run as a 
redundant task on the fault-tolerant computing platform: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each sampled sensor value is initially a non-replicated data item, so it must go 
through an interactive consistency algorithm before it is processed by the sensor 
selection logic.   This insures that every redundant task executing the sensor 
selection logic is operating on the same set of values and that faults in the I/O 
system do not corrupt this selection process.  In a properly layered system, this is 
accomplished by the lower redundancy management layer.  In this approach, the 
designer of the selection logic can focus on the algorithm for selecting a value 
from multiple distinct sensors. 
 
For discrete inputs, the sensor selection process involves selection of a  
value from a set of redundant 1 or 0 values. The input selection process for 
sensors with a range of values is significantly more complicated.  Usually some 
form of mid-value selection is used on all inputs that did not come from sensors 
detected as failed is employed.    In systems that do not have a separate IVHM 
capability, thresholds can be used to detect sensor failure locally.  If a value of a 
sensor deviates significantly from the mid-value, it is declared as failed. 
 
Redundant processors + I/O
Redundancy Management
Operating System 
Sensor
Selection App 2 App 3 App 4
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Sometimes there are dynamic relationships between different kinds of sensors, 
e.g. speed and acceleration.   These dynamic relationships can be leveraged to 
synthesize more accurate values for the required measurements.  This can be 
especially useful when critical sensors have failed.   This approach is called 
analytic redundancy. These techniques tend to be very application specific 
because they depend upon the dynamic characteristics of a particular vehicle.   
 
21 Concluding Remarks 
 
The design of a fault-tolerant computing system is an extremely challenging 
endeavor.  The algorithms and techniques that are at the center of fault-tolerance 
are among the most subtle and difficult to prove in Computer Science.   
Fortunately these algorithms have been vigorously studied and analyzed by the 
academic world.  Many of these have been formally verified and mechanically 
checked using theorem prover technology [Miner04].  It would be foolish to 
design and implement a fault-tolerant computer today without taking advantage 
of this storehouse of results.   
 
The study of fault tolerance cannot be divorced from reliability analysis.  A basic 
understanding of Markov modeling and analysis is essential to understanding the 
tradeoffs that must be made in the design of a fault-tolerant computer.  
Fortunately this is not a difficult thing to obtain [Butler95].  The solution of these 
models is straight-forward using freely available programs such as SURE or 
STEM [Butler88]. 
 
The selection the appropriate fault-tolerance for a system is a complex process 
that depends upon the specified reliability, mission duration, maintenance 
processes, cost, expected lifetime and many other factors.  In this short primer 
the key concepts and techniques available to the fault-tolerant system designer 
have been introduced.   
 
22 Glossary 
 
Application Programming Interface (API): A language processed by an operating 
system (or lower layer in the system), which is used to provide services to the 
applications.  
 
Application software: the software that implements the primary functions of the 
system.  This software executes in an environment providing by system software 
(e.g. the operating system) which is distinct from the application software.   
 
Asynchronous: Systems that do not synchronize the clocks of the redundant 
processors are called asynchronous systems 
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Built-In-Test (BIT): diagnostics which run automatically and seek to isolate faulty 
components.   
 
Byzantine fault: A fault with arbitrary failure manifestation including asymmetric 
ones where different good components get different values. 
 
Clock Synchronization: Clock synchronization is a fundamental issue in fault 
tolerance which overcomes the problem that the internal clocks of different 
processors drift apart.  Clock synchronization is based upon distributed 
algorithms that periodically adjust the local clocks in a way that is not vulnerable 
to a failure in any single clock. 
 
Coincident faults: The presence of two or more faults in a redundant system at 
the same time. 
 
Common Cause Fault (CCF): A fault that can trigger multiple simultaneous errors 
in different fault containment regions. 
 
Commercial  Off-The-Shelf (COTS): software or hardware that is available for 
sale to the general public. 
 
Coverage: An ambiguous term that is the fraction of faults “covered”.  See 
section 17.4 for several different definitions. 
 
Design Error: A design error is a difference between the system requirement and 
the specified design.  The failure mechanism is in the human mind. Design errors 
range from syntax errors in the program code to fundamental mistakes including 
the use of wrong algorithms, inconsistent interfaces, and software architecture 
mistakes. 
 
Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR): is a process that allows safety-critical 
mechanisms to claim adequate fault tolerance through rigorous design, analysis, 
testing, and inspection practices rather than through true physical redundancy. 
 
Distributed Diagnosis: A key capability in a fault-tolerant system: each 
component of the system must maintain correct information about which other 
components in the system have failed.  It is important that the view of all working 
components be the same. 
 
Error:  The manifestation of a fault -- an incorrect state of hardware or software 
due to a defect in a component, physical interference from the environment, or 
from an incorrect design.  
 
Error detection: The process of detecting that a component has failed by 
observing a difference between system state and the expected state. 
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Error recovery: the process of restoring the system state to an error-free state 
after the occurrence of a fault (usually transient). 
 
Exact-match voting:  The process of determining a  “voted” value in a system 
where any value that is not bit-for-bit identical to the majority value is known to be 
faulty.   
 
Fail stop: A component stops producing outputs when it fails. 
 
Failure:  The result of a system deviating from the specified function of that 
system because of an error. 
 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A methodology that helps the 
system designer to identify and handle hazards in safety-critical systems. 
 
Fault:  A defect in the hardware, software or system component that can lead to 
an incorrect state (i.e. error). 
 
Fault Containment Region (FCR): a subsystem that will operate correctly 
regardless of any arbitrary fault outside the region.  
 
Fault masking: A method for preventing an error from propagating to a system 
output and hence insuring that only correct values are propagated. 
 
Formal Methods: Formal Methods refers to mathematically rigorous techniques 
and tools for the specification, design and verification of software and hardware 
systems. The phrase "mathematically rigorous" means that the specifications 
used in formal methods are well-formed statements in a mathematical logic and 
that the formal verifications are rigorous deductions in that logic (i.e. each step 
follows from a rule of inference and hence can be checked by a mechanical 
process.) The value of formal methods is that they provide a means to 
symbolically examine the entire state space of a digital design (whether hardware 
or software) and establish a correctness or safety property that is true for all 
possible inputs. 
 
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA): An architectural concept wherein functions 
that have historically been separated and often of different criticality are hosted 
on a common computing resource. 
 
Integration testing: A late life-cycle phase of software development where all of 
the software modules of the system are combined and tested together.   
 
Interactive Consistency: A property of a system which states that the input values 
to the system are distributed in a manner that guarantees that all redundant tasks 
get exactly the same value even in the presence of faults. 
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Intermittent fault: A fault that appears, disappears and then reappears. 
 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF): is the average time between failures of a 
system.  When the failure rate of the system is constant, it is the reciprocal of the 
failure rate. 
 
N fault tolerant: a system that is still operational after N consecutive faults (not 
simultaneous).  For example, a two fault tolerant (2FT) system is a system that is 
"fail operational, fail operational", i.e. after two sequential faults, the system is still 
a functioning system.   
 
N-plex: a fault-tolerant computer composed of N voting lanes (i.e. N FCRs).  Also 
referred to as a N-modular redundant (NMR) system. 
 
Permanent fault: a fault that continues to produce errors. 
 
Quadraplex: a fault-tolerant computer composed of 4 voting lanes (i.e. 4 FCRs). 
 
Real Time Operating System (RTOS): is a multitasking operating system 
intended for applications with strict deadline requirements. 
 
Reconfiguration: the process of removing a faulty component from the system. 
 
Self-Checking Pair: Built out of two identical processing elements.  The two 
outputs are compared and if there is a miscompare, then the output is inhibited 
making the SCP fail-stop. 
 
Synchronous: Systems that synchronize the clocks of the redundant processors 
are called synchronous systems 
 
Threshold Voting: A threshold is the maximum amount of deviation from the 
average value that is tolerated before a component is declared to be faulty.  
Threshold voting refers to the use of thresholds when voting in a fault-tolerant 
system.   It is usually used in conjunction with mid-value select. 
 
Transient fault: a fault that appears for a short time and then disappears  
 
Triplex: a fault-tolerant computer composed of 3 voting lanes (i.e. 3 FCRs).  Also 
referred to as a triple-modular redundant (TMR) system.  
 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR): A fault-tolerant architecture that uses three 
processors and voting to produce the output. 
 
Voting:  the process of selecting a final result from the outputs of redundant 
channels or redundant computations. 
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